European influence on Ethiopian antitrust regime: a comparative and functional analysis of some problems by Feyissa, Hailegabriel G.
European Influence on Ethiopian 
Antitrust Regime:
A Comparative and Functional Analysis of Some Problems
Hailegabriel G. Feyissa*
Introduction
Despite a noticeable European influence on the Ethiopian competition legal 
regime, some aspects of Ethiopia’s 2003 Trade Practice Proclamation are still 
inadequate to appropriately deal with certain competition problems. The 
limitations of the rules need to be put right since achievement of the very 
goals of competition law requires a well designed set of competition rules and 
effective implementation schemes.
This article attempts to make a brief comparative and functional analysis 
of some of the major inadequacies of the Trade Practices Proclamation. A 
brief appreciation of the background to the 2003 Ethiopian Trade Practice 
Proclamation and a subsequent perusal at the European marks of the same 
will serve as stepping stones to comparative and functional analysis of some 
problems related to the Ethiopian antitrust regime. Finally, I argue in favour 
of a functionally sound approach to solve some problematic aspects of the 
existing Ethiopian competition legislation.
1. Background: Free Market and Competition Regulation in 
Ethiopia
Regulation of competition is a fairly recent phenomenon in Ethiopia. Before 
1991, the economic policy in Ethiopia was not based on the ideals of free 
market aside from the introduction of a mixed economic policy around 1990. 
The military (socialist) regime - that seized power after the 1974 revolution - 
took measures that reduced the role of the private sector and the free market 
that had started to flourish during the imperial regime of Haile Selassie.* 1 
Consequently, key motives for the regulation of competition, e.g. (a failure 
in) a free market, were absent from the outset.
* LL.B, LL.M (University of Groningen), Lecturer in Law, Bahir Dar University
1 Before 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie’s (1930-1974) Ethiopia opted for market oriented 
mixed economy which saw a considerable involvement in the economy by the private 
sector; see, e.g., Kibre M., Policy-induced Barriers to Competition in Ethiopia, 
Jaipur, CUTS International, 2007, at 4 (hereinafter Kibre).
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Works to bring the market back into play have been done since the last 
decade of the previous millennium, after the downfall of the socialist regime. 
As part of the move towards liberalised and free market economy, different 
restructuring works has been put in place.2 The different schemes of 
liberalisation have enhanced the role of the private sector in the Ethiopian 
economy. would this, however, guarantee smooth competition in the actual 
market? The answer would be in the negative. Neither privatization of 
nationalised industries nor opening up of previously closed markets would 
necessarily guarantee smooth competition in the actual market as there are 
structural barriers inherited from the previous system which created 
monopolies in various sectors. Moreover, the absence of competition culture 
may tempt some businessmen, dominant or non-dominant, to engage in 
restrictive business practices. Such problems could only be dealt with 
appropriately if competition is regulated.
Ethiopia enacted its first ever competition law only in 2003 - more than 
a decade after it started a move away from socialism. One could see the 2003 
Trade Practice Proclamation as part of the worldwide surge in competition 
legislation happening after the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe. The 
growing consensus that antitrust law is not a luxury, but a necessity, to 
developing free market states - that are not of course invulnerable to 
anticompetitive practices - has been one of the main driving forces behind the 
growing interest among states like Ethiopia in antitrust regulation. The 
universal rise in competition endorsement has also been motivated by factors 
external to the concerned states. Ethiopia does not seem to be an exception to 
this.3 As would be seen in the forthcoming sections, Ethiopia’s antitrust 
regulation has benefited from the already well developed competition 
statutory and case laws of the traditional free market economies - most 
importantly that of Europe.
2 These, for example, include privatisation of previously nationalised enterprises and 
enactment of new legislation allowing the participation of the private sector in areas 
that in the past were closed to them; Kibre rightly notes that these restructuring 
processes could be understood as being part and parcel of a broad competition policy; 
Kibre, p.4 et seq.
3 In part, Ethiopia’s competition law seems to be the result of Ethiopia’s engagement in 
regional common markets (see below for more on this). The conditioning of funds 
[from international funding agencies (IMF and World Bank)] on a range of 
liberalisation issues which include the adoption of different competition policies, 
including law, is the other likely reason for the adoption of the competition law.
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2. Antitrust Rules in the Trade Practice Proclamation: Its 
European Marks
Ethiopian antitrust regulatory rules are embodied in the Trade Practice 
Proclamation (TPP) enacted in 2003. In Part Two of the Proclamation, 
particularly Articles 6-11, spell out two of the three conventional competition 
rules. While Art.6 deals with anti-competitive practices (cartels), Art. 11 
prohibits abuse of dominance. The first of the two provisions reads “No 
person may directly or indirectly enter into any written or oral agreement that 
restricts limits, impedes or in any other way harms free competition, in the 
process of production, supply, distribution or marketing of goods and 
services.”4
Apart from this general rule, the same article provides some exemplary 
anti-competitive practices which include: (a) agreements of jointly fixing 
prices; (b) agreements for collusive tendering as to determine market price; 
(c) agreements as to market or consumer segmentation; (d) agreements as to 
allocation by quota of production and sales; (e) concerted refusal to deal, sell 
and render services.
Article 11, on the other hand, contains the Ethiopian rule on abuse of 
dominance. Accordingly, “no person may carry on trade which gives 
opportunity to control a relevant market for goods or services; or limit access 
to a relevant market or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or being 
likely to have adverse effects on market development.”5 Like Article 6(1), the 
general rule in Article 11(1) is followed by some illustrative abuses [by a 
dominant undertaking]. Inter alia, these include (a) the direct or indirect 
unfair imposition of excessively high or low selling price or service fee or 
withholding supply or any pre-emptive behaviour to impede entry into 
market; (b) the selling of similar goods or services to consumers on unequal 
terms or payments; (c) the application to dealers in transaction of unequal 
terms in respect of similar goods thereby placing some at competitive 
disadvantage; (d) to impose a condition of combined sales on a buyer when 
the goods or services so combined are not required by the buyer; (f) refusing 
sales of goods or services to customers without good cause; and (g) selling at 
a price that does not cover production cost to eliminate fair competition.6
4 Art.6 (1), TPP.
5 Ibid, Art.11 (1).
6 The appropriateness of the inclusion of some of these specific abusive practices is 
questioned by some; see, e.g., a report by USAID, Ethiopia Commercial Law & 
Institutional Reform and Trade Diagnostic, USAID, 2007 at 60[hereinafter USAID
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The European marks on the Ethiopian rules on anti-competitive practices 
or restrictive business practices (RBP) are very visible. A cursory look at 
Art.6, TPP and its European equivalent - Art.81, the 1957 Rome Treaty 
establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) - reveals that the latter 
has been the primary material source to the former. The text of Art.81 (1) of 
the EC Treaty reads:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in 
particular those which:
a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions;
b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment;
c) share markets or sources of supply;
d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.
This provision is the basis for numerous domestic antitrust rules on RBP, both 
within and outside Europe. Apparently, the Ethiopian antitrust rules on RBP 
are equally inspired by this European material source. Despite the absence of 
complete verbal similarity between the corresponding provisions of the TPP 
and the EC Treaty, Art.6 (1) of the former is noticeably influenced by the 
Art.81(1) of the latter. Firstly, same as the latter, the former declares that any 
form of agreement that prevents, restricts, or impedes competition is 
prohibited. Secondly and most importantly, Art.6 (2), TPP takes on the 
illustrative anti-competitive practices enumerated under Art.81 (1), EC 
Treaty. For instance, one may look at the striking similarity between (1) the 
order and (2) type of illustrative RBPs listed under Art.6 (2), TPP and Art.81 
(1), EC Treaty.7
Report]; Harqa H., Competition Policies and Laws: Major Concepts and an Overview 
of Ethiopian Trade Practice Law, 2 Mizan Law Review 33 (2008), at 48[hereinafter 
Harqa].
7 Both under Art.6 (2), TPP and Art.81 (1), EC Treaty, joint price fixing is the first in the 
list of illustrative RBPs. Moreover, note that Art.6 (2), TPP adopts [directly or 
indirectly] almost every single illustrative RBPs mentioned in Art.81 (1), EC Treaty.
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Incidentally, it is worth noting that Ethiopia has apparently enacted its 
rules on RBP in accordance with Art.558 of the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) Treaty, which itself is comparable, if not 
identical, with its European counterpart, i.e., Art.81 of the EC Treaty. 
Membership in the Common Market entails, inter alia, the enactment of 
domestic antitrust legislation or the application of the regional Treaty rules to 
domestic competition matters.9 In other words, Ethiopian rules on anti­
competitive practices are, in part, the result of Ethiopia’s commitment to the 
regional free trade arrangement, COMESA.
The prohibitions embodied in Art.11 of TPP are also comparable with 
those under Art.82 of the EC Treaty. Art.82 of the EC Treaty, embodying the 
European law on abuse of dominance stipulates:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within 
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions;
b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers;
c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage;
d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature 
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.
As it is the case with the Ethiopian rules on cartels, the rules on abuse of 
dominance bear European origin. The very preference of the term abuse of
8 The text of this article, inter alia, reads: the Member States agree to prohibit any
agreement between undertakings or concerted practice which has its object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market.” Note 
the verbal similarity between the texts of this article and its European counterpart.
9 Ethiopia and other member states have been assisted by COMESA in developing their 
respective domestic competition legislations. Apparently, states who fail to adopt one 
or another piece of law are obliged to apply the regional competition rule enshrined 
under Art.55, COMESA Treaty; see Stewart T., Clarke J. & Joekes S., Competition 
Law in Action: Experience from Developing Countries, International Development 
Research Centre, Ottawa, 2007, at 45[hereinafter, Stewart, Clarke & Joekes].
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dominance, instead of anti-monopolisation, itself confirms the European root 
of the rule as the term was first coined and used in Europe.10 Furthermore, the 
marked similarity [in form and content] between Art.11, TPP and Art.82, EC 
Treaty tells the rest.
institutions of antitrust enforcement might as well manifest instances of 
European influence on the Ethiopian antitrust regime. An administrative body 
- Trade Practice Investigation Commission - has been set up to enforce the 
regulation. Answerable to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the 
Commission is empowered to (1) investigate complaints submitted to it by 
any aggrieved party, (2) to take administrative measures or/and give penalty 
decisions.11 Thus, Ethiopian competition law is set to be enforced within the 
context of administrative law. At this point as well, the Ethiopian system is 
generally comparable with the European - where, unlike in the US, antitrust 
cases are initially and mainly enforced administratively.
As could be evident from the discussion so far, the Ethiopian antitrust 
regulation is modelled after that of advanced western free market economies, 
i.e., mainly that of Europe. Apart from the formal and substantive similarity 
between Ethiopian and European antitrust rules, Ethiopia’s preference of 
administrative, than judicial, enforcement antitrust is seemingly inspired by 
European experience.
Incidentally, one may question whether there would be any sound reason 
for a developing country like Ethiopia to opt for antitrust law that “mirrors” 
that of developed free market economies of Europe? Put differently, would 
Ethiopia’s adoption of an antitrust regime based primarily on developed free 
market economies be level-headed in face of the triumphant argument that 
“there is no unique universally applicable competition law and policy”?12
First, core principles of competition law hold good for all states and 
could be part of any antitrust law.13 The traditional motive underlying antitrust 
regulation - the fear of inefficiency resulting from monopoly power - is 
hardly absent in Ethiopia. Least developed states like Ethiopia cannot afford
10 Europeans use the term abuse of dominance to identify what in USA and similar 
jurisdictions is generally known as “anti -monopolisation” rules.
11 Art.12 et seq.,TPP
12 This argument is underlined on the fact that there are huge socio-economic, political 
and cultural differences between developed and developing nations.
13 See, e.g., Adhikari R. & Knight-John M., What Type of Competition Policy and Law 
Should a Developing Country Have?, South Asia Economic Journal, 5(2004), at 2 
(hereinafter Adhikari & Knight-John); Dimgba N., Introduction to Competition Law: a 
sine qua non to a Liberalised Economy, 2006 , at 30(available at: 
www.globalcompetitionforum.com) [hereinafter Dimgba]
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inefficiency. Second, the science/art of antitrust regulation in traditional free 
market states - where the regulation has been tested by practice for decades - 
readily supplements the understanding, in the receiving state, of meanings of 
the core principles.14 Moreover, the ever changing character of antitrust 
concerns in traditional free market states would give insights into improved 
competition policy objectives in emerging free market economies. Therefore, 
Ethiopia or other emerging free market countries, may pick up elements out of 
the major pre-existing antitrust regulatory systems, which best suits their 
context. 15
3. What to Expect from the Enforcement of the Antitrust Rules
Regulating markets through state intervention has been necessitated for 
markets do not always work “perfect”. Put in other words, market failure 
provides the very typical rationale for government regulation of the market.16 
Governments of various free market economies intervene mainly through 
competition policies/regulations.17 What do we mean by “market failure”? 
Why does it matter? What do we specifically want to achieve by intervening 
in a failed market?
At least within the context of antitrust regulation, market is said to have 
failed when competition is eliminated from a certain market. The elimination 
of competition from a certain free market matters because it takes away, 
according to a highly persuasive economic theory, the greatest benefits which 
otherwise would be there in the presence of competition.18 What is 
disadvantageous to the society is not necessarily the absence, in a certain 
market, of competition. It is rather the eventual economic loss - what is 
usually known as deadweight loss - that provides the economic raison d’etre 
behind antitrust regulation. The major concerns of antitrust regulation are 
summarized by Viscusi et al:
“...because of the control over the price exerted by a monopoly [market power
that may be created through the elimination of competition] there are economic
efficiency losses to society. Product quality and diversity may also be affected.
14 Dimgba, at 30.
15 For instance, Joan-Ramon Borrell recommends either American or European antitrust 
regime or a blend of the two depending on the strength of law enforcement institutions 
in a specific country. For details see generally Borrel J., Choosing among American, 
European, or no Antitrust at all, 2005(available at www.ssrn.com), [hereinafter Borrel]
16 Bowels R., Law and the Economy, Martine Robertson & Comp., Oxford, 1985, at 165.
17 Harqa, at 35.
18 Johns A. & Sufrin B., EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd Edition, 
OUP, London, 2008, at 1. [hereinafter Johns & Sufrin]
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Society could potentially be better off if limitations were imposed on the 
operation of a monopoly or a similar kind of concentrated industry.”19
Law and economics scholars agree that one, if not the sole, aim of regulating 
competition is to maintain the competitiveness of a certain free market for it 
maximises efficiency and, in return, promotes public [consumer] welfare. 
Though antitrust regulations in different jurisdictions have not always been 
enacted with the sole aim of efficiency, efficiency [along with consumer 
welfare] still remains the primary goal we specifically want to achieve by 
intervening in a failed market.
TPP has two expressly stated objectives: (1) to bring a fair competitive 
process through the prevention and elimination of anti-competitive practices, 
and (2) to safeguard the interests of consumers through the prevention of any 
restraints on the efficient supply and distribution of goods and services. 
Accordingly, maintaining the competitive process (or the presumably efficient 
supply and distribution mechanism) in the actual market through the 
elimination of RBPs for the benefit of the society at large and the consumer in 
particular is the economic rationale behind antitrust regulation in Ethiopia. 
These economically sound objectives - the most widely recognised objectives 
of competition law elsewhere - are not supplemented20 by other stated 
objectives although some specific provisions, as would be seen below, make 
us doubt the exclusiveness of the two expressly stated economic objectives. In 
the immediately following section, the adequacy of some specific regulatory 
rules of the TPP in achieving these economic objectives is appraised.
4. A Comparative and Functional Inquiry into Some Aspects of 
the Ethiopian Law
A. the Limited Scope of Application: Robbing the Regulation its Main 
Targets?
in most antitrust regimes, the scope of application of the law is broad enough 
to include as many economic activities as possible. But, some carefully 
designed limitations on the scope of application are recognised. in Europe, for
19 Viscusi W., Vernon J. & Harrington J, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 2nd 
Edition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998, at 5.
20 Other specific objectives of competition law are recognised in different countries. The 
1998 Competition Act of South Africa, for instance, has, inter alia, the objective of 
encouraging small and medium sized enterprises so as “to promote a greater spread of 
ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged 
persons”; Stewart, Clarke & Joekes, at 21 et seq.; also, some country-specific factors 
determine objectives of competition law and policy (see, e.g., Adhikari & Knight-John, 
at 3-5).
3(2) Mizan Law Rev. European Influence on the Ethiopian Antitrust Regime 279
instance, certain specific sectors are made outside the scope of application of 
certain competition rules.21 Inter alia, this is justified in terms of services of 
general economic interest which, if competition rules are applied, may not be 
provided adequately.22 Other public interest considerations have also been 
used to either limit or broaden the scope of application of competition law.23
In Ethiopia, as well, antitrust regulation seems to exclude certain firms 
and economic sectors from its scope of application. As a rule, the 
proclamation applies to all persons involved in any commercial activity. 
Exceptionally, the inapplicability of the law may, on a case by case basis, be 
considered if (1) commercial activities that are, according to investment 
proclamation, exclusively reserved for the Government; (2) enterprises having 
significant impact on development and designed by the Government to fasten 
growth and facilitate development; and (3) basic goods and services that are 
subject to price regulation.24
The first thing one may note is perhaps the discretion the regulator - the 
Trade Practice Commission - enjoys in deciding the [inapplicability of the 
rules to certain categories of undertakings. Obviously, this risks legal 
certainty. This is of particular economic implication as the Commission 
decides [inapplicability of the law to firms only after an alleged violation of 
the law:
“The broad discretion of the Commission to exempt enterprises from the law, 
and to do so ex post facto, does not provide the assurances and predictability 
that would encourage innovation, expansion, or entrance [to a market] by 
entrepreneurs whose success depends upon free competition.”25
21 For details on various limits of European competition law, see e.g., Johns & Sufrin, at
615 et seq.
22 Art. 86 (2), the 1957 Treaty of Rome (the Treaty establishing the European 
Community). This provision is an instance of legislative approval to the theory that free 
market principles are not ideal in all situations. For instance, the efficient and 
uninterrupted provision of some basic public services requires the deliberate granting of 
exclusive or special rights to certain undertakings involved in the provision of the basic 
public services. This is obviously against the principle of competitive market. Yet, 
policy makers in various jurisdictions have long understood the importance of 
exceptionally doing away with free market principles.
23 For instance, industrial, trade, and other public interest considerations including 
affirmative actions aiming at rectifying social inequalities have, in some jurisdictions, 
been given emphasis at the expense of the traditional concerns of competition law, i.e., 
market efficiency; see, generally, Stewart, Clarke & Joekes, at 21 et esq. and Adhikari 
& Knight-John, at 2-5.
24 Art. 5, TPP.
25 USAID Report, at 59-60.
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Apart from this, there seems to be another greater danger. In the absence of 
any set of interpretative guidelines to be considered [in deciding applicability 
or otherwise], the ideal targets of the law may easily be absolved from 
liability if the Commission discretionarily decides not to apply the law against 
them. Given the fact that the main actors in the Ethiopian economy (even in 
sectors that are not exclusively reserved to the state) are big state monopolies 
who possibly benefit from exemption under Article 5, one cannot help 
questioning the efficiency or welfare “gains”26 the inapplicability of the law 
may bring. This would also, at least in the future, be one of the issues that test 
the impartiality of the administrative organ overseeing the enforcement of the 
antitrust regulation.27
B. Don’t We Need Regulatory Rules on Mergers and Vertical 
Agreements?
Cartels, intent to monopolise (abuse of dominance), and mergers are the 
traditional concerns of antitrust regulation. A fairly detailed antitrust 
legislation includes rules not only on cartels and abuse of dominance but also 
on mergers - which are of ex ante character. Scholars suggest ex ante or 
preventive as opposed to curative measure is a better way to fight 
anticompetitive practices in smaller economies like Ethiopia.28 Some studies 
as well show that ex-ante authorizations such as cartel registrations and 
competition restraint authorizations are better suited where law enforcement 
institutions are moderately strong.29
However, emerging free market states including Ethiopia still leave 
mergers unregulated. Though ex-ante authorisation rules are recognised 
within the context of anticompetitive practices,30 explicit merger control 
regulations are absent in TPP. The absence of merger rules in TPP may 
perhaps be attributable to the usual developing countries’ qualm for it. Many 
developing countries believe that the creation of domestic monopolies 
enhances economies of scale and this in return would help international
26 Assuming that the law’s main objective is efficiency and consumer welfare, one may 
argue any decision of inapplicability is only meant to serve efficiency or welfare 
purposes - and nothing else.
27 For now we may safely reckon with what the Commissioner of the Trade Practices 
Commission has, in a fairly recent scholarly article, stated. According to the 
Commissioner, a strong case that challenges the impartiality of the Commission is yet 
to come; see Harqa, at 49.
28 Adhikari & Knight-John, at 14 et seq.
29 See generally Borrel.
30 See, e.g., Arts.7-9 of TPP which allow various ex-ante rules.
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competitiveness.’31 Though this might not be miles away from economic 
truth, especially where export competitiveness is among key developmental 
objectives, there are competing empirical evidences showing the relevance of 
merger control regulations for developing countries.32 Hence, the absence of 
rules on merger makes the Ethiopian antitrust regime incomplete33 and this 
situation may inappropriately benefit dominant firms at the expense of 
consumer welfare and efficiency -which are the declared objectives of the 
law.
The prohibition of vertical restraints is also unclear from the reading of 
the statute’s provisions dealing with collusive behaviours.34 The fact that 
Article 6(2) enumerates only conventional horizontal35 restraints may 
arguably be taken as a legislative approval of vertical agreements which 
seldom pose serious competitive problems. However, the unqualified 
permission of vertical (distribution) agreements may impact on efficiency 
and, particularly consumer welfare:
“...if practices such as resale price maintenance, excusive and selective 
distribution are widespread, retailers engaged in significant price discounts 
will be eliminated from the market, consumers may be deprived of innovative 
retailing and price discounting so that prices may increase, price competition 
between suppliers may be softened, [and importantly the situation] may 
foreclose the market to competitors.”36
C. Economic Analysis of Comparative Significance of RBPs
Adjudicatory bodies often apply rules formalistically. This formalistic 
approach has not been at ease in so far as antitrust enforcement is concerned. 
There have been attacks on the formalistic judicial approach (in preference for 
an economic approach) to the analysis of the effects of anticompetitive
31 Stewart, Clarke & Joekes at 24; Adhikari & Knight-John, at 6-7
32 Stewart, Clarke & Joekes, at 24.
33 one may, however, argue that merger cases may in some instances be governed by the 
rules on abuse of dominance. This was the case in Europe before a separate merger 
regulation has been put in place. But, the rules on abuse of dominance do, as will be 
seen below, have their own drawbacks that may still leave some merger problems 
unsolved; thus, further rules on merger control would still be needed.
34 Harqa, at 47.
35 Horizontal restraints could simply be equated with collusions between competitors, 
e.g., two or more suppliers of a product. Whereas, vertical restraints are those collusive 
behaviours involving non-competitors, e.g., producers and suppliers.
36 Johns & Sufrin, at 695. It is also unclear whether cartels which falls short of either 
written or oral agreements are caught under Article 6; see, e.g., Harqa, at 47.
practices.37 Economic approach to the analysis of anticompetitive practices is 
particularly important not to categorically prohibit alleged anticompetitive 
practices whose [competitive] advantage, upon economic analysis, would be 
greater than the disadvantages.
TPP seems to implicitly recognise the importance of economic analysis 
of anticompetitive practices within the context of ex-ante authorisation rules 
under Art.7. According to Art.7 of TPP, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
which may authorise agreements between competitors subject to commitments 
by the later, has to first undertake the necessary studies to ensure that 
“advantages of the agreement to the Nation is greater than the 
disadvantages”38 The phrase ensuring that advantages of the agreement to the 
Nation is greater than the disadvantages seems broad enough to even invite 
[economic or non-economic] analysis of factors other than the comparative 
competitive advantages of alleged anticompetitive practices.39 This provision 
seems to introduce an undeclared goal - national economic welfare - of the 
Ethiopian antitrust regime. Even so, the expressly declared objectives of the 
law would have dictated only economic analysis aimed particularly at 
identifying the comparative gains (to, for example, consumers) of supposedly 
anticompetitive agreements. Understandably, however, arguments based on 
strategic trade theory call for the relaxation of competition rules to 
accommodate “the problems of industries that are having serious difficulty 
competing internationally” even at the expense of consumer welfare.40
The rules on Art.7 et seq., however, relate only to ex-ante authorisation. 
Absent ex-ante authorisation, defences based on comparative competitive 
advantages of a restrictive agreement seem to be unacceptable by the 
Commission. Put in other words, there is no clear distinction, under TPP, 
between object and effect cases41 comparable with that recognised in the
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37 For a detailed discussion on this point in the European context, see Johns & Sufrin, at 
209 et seq.
38 Art.7, TPP.
39 It is, for example, argued one of the factors considered under Art.7 is ‘national 
treatment’ which may be used to discriminate against foreign companies in favour of 
domestic ones; see USAID Report, at 60.
40 See, for example, First H., Structural Antitrust Rules and International Competition: 
the Case of Distressed Industries, New York University Law Rev. 62 (1987), at 1054; 
see also Adhikari & Knight-John, at 11-14, for a fair appreciation of how trade and 
other areas of public policy impact on the enforcement of competition law.
41 Some collusive agreements are now known to have as their object the restriction of 
competition; for example, price fixing, market segmentation, and limitation of output or 
sales. These obvert cases of RBPs are usually enumerated in legislations as is the case 
with TPP. Some agreements, on the other hand, do not apparently have the restriction
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European competition jurisprudence. Hence, there would presumably be no 
analysis of economic effects of apparently non-restrictive business practices 
of undertakings. consequently, we may risk allowing anticompetitive 
agreements whose effects are not visible at first sight. conversely, apparently 
anticompetitive agreements which upon critical economic analysis might not 
be prejudicial to either efficiency and/or consumer welfare may 
inappropriately be punished.42
D. Abuse of Dominance under Article 11 Looks Economically Strange!
Defining market and assessing the effects of cartels and/or monopoly power in 
the defined market is now an established part of any antitrust analysis. TPP’s 
rules on abuse of dominance do not seem to be in harmony with this anecdote. 
They do not explicitly require prior definitions of relevant market and, most 
interestingly, dominance within it. Despite the express title of Art.11 being 
abuse of dominance, the provision is addressed to all persons carrying on 
trade irrespective of their dominance in a certain market. Thus, the prohibition 
may ironically be applied to firms with insignificant market power in a certain 
market.43 The literal application of this rule does not make any economic 
sense as regulatory rules on abuse of dominance are basically meant to deal 
with the conduct of dominant [in a defined market] undertakings. As the 
author has noted elsewhere,44 the Trade Practice Investigation Commission - 
the federal agency that interprets the law - apparently applies the law to all 
traders irrespective of their status in a defined market.45 The current
of competition as their object. As such the identification of latent restrictive effects of 
such agreements requires further economic analysis - as this is the best known way to 
look into their economic [competitive] effects on a certain market - before any 
prohibition.
42 It seems, however, the Commission considers the actual effects of the anticompetitive 
practices during the assessment of fine. In fixing the amount of fine, the Commission 
takes into account, among other things, the seriousness of the offense, the damage 
caused and the share of the market affected (Art.27, TPP).
43 See the provisions of Art.11 (1) cited above.
44 Hailegabriel G., Avoid Misuse of Abuse of Dominance Law, Fortune (14 Dec. 2008).
45Even when the Trade Practice Commission interprets the provisions in a manner
compatible with the very purpose of rules on abuse of dominance, it has been the 
interest of the [prosecutor of] Ministry of Trade and Industry that the Commission 
literally interprets the rules notwithstanding the potentially flawed outcomes of such 
interpretation. In a certain legal opinion addressed to the Minister, the prosecutor (on 
Tahsas 23rd 2000 E.C.) expressed its disagreement with the (Tahsas 11th 2000 E.C) 
decision of the Commission in the Ministry of Trade and Industry v. Ato Abdulsemed 
Takele and others and similar other cases -"Teff cases'" wherein the Commission
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application of the law would be futile as “prohibiting single-firm conduct 
without regard to the firm’s dominance opens wide the possibility that either 
competitively neutral or, even, pro-competitive conduct will be prohibited.”46
However, a contextual interpretation of Art. 11 may dictate the 
application of the rules on abuse of dominance to only certain undertakings 
that are dominant in a relevant market.47 For one thing, the very stated 
objectives of the law are efficiency and consumer protection; and the law 
should not be applied to impede these objectives by, for instance, penalising 
pro consumer-welfare conducts. For another, the relevant article is headed 
abuse of dominance, and as such it should be applied to anticompetitive 
conducts by dominant [in a defined market] undertakings, as it is the case in 
other jurisdictions, including Europe - the primary material source of 
Ethiopia's law on competition in general and rules on abuse of dominance in 
particular.
E. The Trade Practices Investigation Commission
One of the benchmarks for the effective enforcement of competition law is 
the establishment of investigative and adjudicatory bodies.48 The investigative 
body (what, in many jurisdictions, is also known as the competition authority) 
participates in triggering investigations, making recommendations in some 
policy decisions by the government, and intervening beforehand when 
undertakings seek ex-ante authorisation of potentially anticompetitive 
agreements. The adjudicatory body (may be an ordinary court), on the other 
hand, arbiters on cases involving alleged violations of competition rules.
The separation of the two bodies is commendable. The dangers of fusing 
the two functions into one agency are, according to Adhikari & Knight-John, 
multifaceted:
“If [investigative and adjudicatory powers are not separated], the competition 
agency may become the investigator, prosecutor, judge...rolled into one. 
Moreover, if both powers are given to one agency, there could be a tendency in 
the competition commission to be biased in favour of the investigation report 
and the judgement could invariably go against the business enterprises, which 
have been seen as conducting anti-competition practices as per the report of the 
investigative agency.”49
dismissed the prosecutor’s case as the latter failed to initially establish the market 
powers of respective defendants.
46 USAID Report, at 60.
47 Harqa, at 48.
48 Adhikari & Knight-John, at 14.
49 Ibid, at 15.
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Art.12 of TPP establishes an “Investigation Commission”. They are ppointed 
by the Prime Minister upon the recommendation of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry. Members of the Commission are drawn from three organs - 
government, private sector and consumers associations.50 Though named the 
“Investigation Commission”, the Ethiopian Trade Practices Investigation 
Commission is not, an investigatory body. It is rather an adjudicatory body 
whose power, according to pertinent provisions of the TPP, is to adjudicate51) 
of complaints submitted to it by any aggrieved party, subject to the 
requirement of approval of its recommendations by the relevant authority.
As there is no independent investigatory body comparable with the 
European Competition Commission or the Office of Fair Trading of the 
United Kingdom that would act as the police of a competitive market, the 
Ministry of Trade - to which the Trade Practices Investigation Commission is 
answerable - has sometimes acted as an investigatory organ. Yet, the 
prosecutor of the Ministry of Trade and Industry has so far seemed to take 
care of the investigation of some competition cases related in particular to 
hoarding - which, under the law, is abuse of dominance - to which the 
Ministry has been sensitive. otherwise, aggrieved parties are practically in 
their own in so far as making their own case is concerned.52 This may 
perhaps be the most serious weakness of the Ethiopian competition regime. 
To begin with, proving cartels and abuses of dominance are sometimes hard, 
if not impossible, even to well-equipped competition authorities let alone 
individual victims who may at times happen to be vulnerable to reprisal from 
the relatively powerful undertakings. Moreover, victim customers/consumers 
who more often than not are less organised are unable or unwilling to face the 
ups and downs of investigating RBPs and subsequently challenging the same. 
These, in turn, may lead to further entrenchment of anticompetitive practices 
in the yet fragile market.
50 Art. 13, TPP; yet, members have mainly been drawn from the government. It now 
appears the Commission is functionally non-existent due to internal crisis. Otherwise, 
it has been composed of five commissioners all of whom are drawn from the 
‘’government’’; it has been chaired by an MP, a former Minister of Justice, and has 
included chief economic advisor to the Prime Minister, governor of the National Bank 
of Ethiopia, governor of the Quality and Standards Authority of Ethiopia, and 
commissioner of the Federal Cooperatives Commission.
51 Stating one of the powers of the Commission, art.15 (1) (a) misleadingly use the term 
“investigate”. It should rather be read “adjudicate”.
52 This has been the case in some competition cases entertained before the Trade Practice 
Commission.
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Apart from this, the involvement of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 
investigation is ironic. The fact that the adjudicatory body - the Trade 
Practices Investigation Commission - is answerable to the same Ministry 
coupled with the investigatory function of the prosecutor of the Ministry 
apparently makes the Ministry the investigator and arbiter of competition 
cases. Thus, the crucially sought separation of adjudicatory and investigatory 
functions of competition agencies is seemingly absent in Ethiopia.53
The commissioners, assuming primarily other responsibilities, meet 
regularly once in a month unless extraordinary meeting is called.54 The 
Commission, which does not have its own budget, may be assisted by experts 
whose employment/ appointment has to be, of course, approved by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry - to whose ministry the Commission is 
answerable.55 With this limited time and resource, the Commission entertains 
competition cases along with non-competition ones. This, as rightly noted by 
some commentators,56 may impact on the overall efficiency of the 
Commission whose success has already been doubted on grounds of 
independence and competence.57
Decisions given by the Commission, upon approval by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, are appealable to the Federal High Court. However, 
appeal seems to be available only with respect to administrative measures 
and/or penalty decisions and not against any Commission decisions on points 
of facts and/or law.58 This, coupled with the limitations stated above, may 
hinder the rendition of impartial judgement.
A new draft trade practices law has been initiated by the Commission 
with a view, inter alia, to improve the effectiveness of the antitrust regulatory
53 The practical fusion of adjudicatory and investigative functions into the organs of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry has been a cause for some concern. The temptations of 
the Ministry to have its cases decided (by the Commission) in its prosecutor’s favour is 
evident in the Ministry’s instructions to the Commission in a letter dated 6 Tir 2000 
E.C. The letter sought the reconsideration of the Commission’s two recommendations 
dated Hedar 27th 2000 E.C. and Tahsas 11th 2000 E.C based on the Legal Opinion of 
Ministry’s Prosecutor. These two recommendations involved a total of eight cases.
54 Art.14, TPP.
55 Art.15 (1)(f),TPP.
56 USAID Report, at 63 et seq.; Kibre, at 20 et seq.
57 Ibid; established in 2004, the Commission has passed a ruling on only one third of the 
cases brought to it as of Nov.2008 [according to a news report by Fortune, 2 Nov., 
2008].
58 See Art.17, TPP.
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body.59 To the best knowledge of the author, however, the Commission - 
whose investigative and adjudicatory limitations are to be remedied with a 
purported endorsement of the new draft - is currently out of function. Hence, 
there are glooms over optimistic developments relating to the structure of the 
competition agency.
Conclusion
Antitrust regulations are mainly directed at problems related to monopoly 
power. They aim at rectifying impediments posed (by monopoly power) on 
efficiency and consumer welfare through rules that impact on the economic 
behaviour of business firms. The efficacy of the rules in meeting the desire to 
prevent deadweight loss, however, depends on many factors such as their 
scope of application, the relative specificity of the rules, and the room left to 
economic analysis of alleged violations.
Though it may appear premature to judge the success or otherwise of the 
new antitrust regime of Ethiopia within only few years of its foundation, some 
limitations have already been noticed. First, exemptions available to certain 
undertakings have unnecessarily left the scope of inapplicability of the law 
wide. Second, additional rules are still needed to squarely address, inter alia, 
(1) mergers (2) vertical agreements and (3) effect cases. Though efficiency 
friendly mergers and practices need not be punished, care should be taken not 
to allow mergers and anticompetitive practices which have restrictive effects 
on competition. Third, the very objectives of the law would be nuanced by the 
application of the rules on abuse of dominance to all undertakings without 
prior market definition and establishment of dominance within it, even though 
contextual interpretation may partly and tentatively solve the problem. 
Finally, the legal structure of the Trade Practice Investigation Commission - 
which is an adjudicatory body - and its current institutional crisis coupled 
with the absence of an independent investigatory body have practically made 
the antitrust regime handicapped.
Comparative analysis of some of the existing limitation of the regime 
reveals that the problems may temporarily be tackled by, for example, (1) 
contextual interpretation of ambiguous provisions and (2) replicating 
experiences of other jurisdictions, in particular those from where the law has 
drawn its material sources. For the long run, however, the inadequate 
Ethiopian antitrust regime needs to be revisited for legislative and structural 
improvement. -------------- ■
59 “Office to endorse new Trade Practices Law soon ”, Walta Information Centre (4, 
Nov., 2008) [available at www.amharic.waltainfo.com; accessed at 4 Nov.2009].
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